Comments

NAFTA & The Environmental Side
Agreement: Fusing Economic
Development with Ecological
Responsibility*

Despite a well-publicized and hotly contested debate between
the Clinton administration and an environmental coalition, the
substance of the North American Free Trade Agreement and its
EnvironmentalSide Agreement remains a mystery to most Americans. Both sides offered impressive statistics, but considerablyfew
facts. This article presents a substantive analysis of the agreement, the environmental questions surroundingthe agreement, and
its capacity to provide both economic and ecological enrichment.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

II.

INTRODUCTION

A.
B.

III.

......

.....

......................................

THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES TO

The Industrializationof Mexico's Border Towns ...................
Lowering Environmental Standards in the United States ............

NAFTA &
A.
B.

NAFTA .......................

1026

1026
1027
1030

THE ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE AGREEMENT .....................

1032

NAFTA ...............
.........
...........................
The Environmental Side Agreement ..............
.............

1032
1034

* The author wishes to extend special thanks to Professor Jorge Vargas for his
advice, suggestions, and support.

1025

IV.

ANALYSIS ..............

A.
B.
C.
V.

.

..

...................
...
.

CONCLUSION ...............

......

I.

......................

.

....

NAFTA .................................
....
The Environmental Side Agreement....
....
Independent Environmental Trends in Mexico...........

..

.... .

...

....

.

1042
1043
1045
1052

1055

INTRODUCTION

The United States, Canada, and Mexico are in the process of forging a relationship unparalleled anywhere else in the world. The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which became
effective on January 1, 1994, has been courted by many as the next
savior of a depressed U.S. economy. By establishing a six trillion
dollar market, the United States has become a member of the largest free market in the world.'
NAFTA is not, however, without its critics. One of the strongest
attacks has come from environmentalists who predict that such a significant increase in trade will have disastrous environmental ramifications.' This Comment will illustrate why this prediction is
inaccurate and how NAFTA will do more to cleanse rather than foul
the U.S.-Mexican environment. In order to effectively present this
hypothesis, this Comment will first analyze the environmental criticisms of NAFTA. Second, this Comment will examine the environmental provisions of both NAFTA and the Environmental Side
Agreement, giving specific attention to the enforcement mechanisms
of the Environmental Side Agreement. Third, this Comment will analyze the effectiveness of NAFTA and the Environmental Side
Agreement in protecting the environment. Finally, this Comment
will illustrate how Mexico's capacity and desire to fulfill its own environmental obligations, coupled with the necessary financing, will
allow our neighbor to the South to independently put an end to decades of ecological abuse.
II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES TO NAFTA
Although NAFTA successfully cleared the hurdle of U.S. congressional approval, Public Citizen, Friends of the Earth, the Sierra
Club, and hundreds of local action groups waged a bitter war
against the trade agreement.' The fight became so intense that on
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32
I.L.M. 289 & 32 I.L.M. 606.
2. GRAY NEWMAN & ANNA SZTERENFELD, BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL'S GUIDE TO
DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO 24 (1993).
3. Michael S. Feeley & Elizabeth Knier, Environmental Considerations of the
Emerging United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 2 DUKE J. COMP. &

INT'L

L.

259, 268 (1992).
4. Peter Behr, For Environmental Groups, Biggest NAFTA Fight Is Intramural,
WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1993, at D10.
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January 7, 1992, the three groups mentioned, in effect forming an
environmental coalition, brought an action against the U.S. Trade
Representative for failure to file an environmental impact statement
as allegedly required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). 5 The lawsuit was a bold maneuver, designed to delay
NAFTA past its effective date and into oblivion. 6 However, despite a
favorable initial ruling by District Court Judge Charles Richey, a
federal appellate court settled the issue by ruling that NAFTA was
7
not subject to the NEPA requirement.
With the dust since settled, and the environmental coalition's battle to defeat NAFTA lost, the question worth bearing in mind is
whether NAFTA will be the environmental pariah opponents
claimed it would be. To answer this question, one must first understand the arguments proposed by NAFTA opponents. In general, the
agreement is characterized as having two fundamental flaws. First,
NAFTA, following well-established precedent in the border region,
will continue to allow industrialization to ravage the environment on
both sides of the border. Second, U.S. environmental standards will
suffer a downward harmonization under NAFTA.8 It is to these two
claims that we now turn.
A.

The Industrializationof Mexico's Border Towns

The first claim, that NAFTA will have grave environmental consequences, is based on the ecological nightmare created in large part
by the maquiladora program, Mexico's current free trade agreement. 9 In particular, NAFTA opponents fear that Mexico will host a
wave of unprecedented industrialization under NAFTA. If this industrialization follows the example of the maquiladora industries,
the Mexican environment will suffer a tremendous setback.
The maquiladora program grew out of a trade policy initiated in
the late 1960s under the Border Industrialization Program,10 which,
5. Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
6. Michael York, President Wins One on NAFTA, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1993,
at Al (assessing the ramifications of an agreement as complicated and broad as NAFTA
would have taken years to complete).
7. Public Citizen, 782 F. Supp. at 139.
8. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 269.
9. Id. at 273.
10. Susanna Peters, Labor Law for the Maquiladora:Choosing Between Workers'
Rights and Foreign Investment, I1 ComP. LAB. L.J. 226, 229 (1990).

1027

in turn, evolved from the National Border Program (PRONAF)."
Under the program, corporations were allowed to import duty-free
capital goods to manufacturing centers just south of the border.
Then, corporations could export the completed product and pay a
duty only on the value added to the good."2 Some thirty years later,
the maquiladora industry employs over 500,000 people and includes
roughly 2200 different manufacturing plants.' 3 In 1993 alone, the
significance of maquiladora operations
was once again evident as
4
maquila exports grew by 17.6% .
This massive industrial expansion has environmentally devastated
the border region. 15 In Mexico, as in most developing countries, the
government has not had the capital needed to enforce environmental
regulations or to provide adequate structural support for the growing
industrial centers. 6 Additionally, the United States has failed to
reprimand U.S. corporate subsidiaries polluting in Mexico.' 7 Compounding this problem is the lack of an adequate hazardous waste
disposal system. The official hazardous waste production of the Mexican industry is reported to be 500,000 tons of hazardous waste per
month.' However, because neither Mexico nor the United States
has an adequate tracking system, the actual monthly production is
probably quite a bit higher. To service this waste, Mexico has but
one authorized waste disposal facility.' 9
Consequently, each producer must ship its waste from its home
state to Monterrey to be treated. Since such a shipment comes at a
tremendous cost, most producers choose to dump their waste
clandestinely in the oceans, rivers, and landfills. Even if every producer chose to ship its waste to the Monterrey plant, one disposal
plant could not service such a large volume of waste. As a result,
only ten percent of hazardous waste produced in Mexico receives any
11. PRONAF was created in 1961 to "stimulate the economic growth, infrastructure and tourism of [Mexico's] border cities." Joshua A. Cohen, A Case Study of Internationalization: The Rise of the Maquiladoras,Bus. MExico, Special Ed. 1994, at 52,
52.
12. Peters, supra note 10, at 231.
13. Cohen, supra note 11, at 52.
14. Augusta Dwyer, Highs and Lows, EL FINANCIERO INT'L, Dec. 27, 1993-Jan. 2,
1994, at 6.

15. Leon Lazaroff, The Polluted Border, EL

FINANCIERO INT'L,

Nov. 29-Dec. 5,

1993, at 10.
16. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 272-73.
17. Malissa H. McKeith, The Environment and Free Trade: Meeting Halfway at
the Mexican Border, 10 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 183, 191 (1991). Under Mexican law,
U.S. factories must be licensed and must either recycle or export hazardous waste
byproducts back to the United States. Recent estimates reveal that only 19% of all
maquiladorasreturn their waste to the country of origin.
18. Claudia Villegas, Hazardous Waste Lacks Dump Sites, EL FINANCIERO INT'L,
Nov. 22-28, 1993, at 8.
19. Id. This facility is located in Monterrey.
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kind of treatment.2 ° Thus, large border towns such as Tijuana, Juarez, Mexicali, Nogales, Matamoros, and Nuevo Laredo are home to
polluted air and water. An article in Business Week reported: "The
factories spew rivers of toxic chemicals each year . . . Sewage and
toxic waste from Tijuana flows into California, blighting beaches.

Cows graze on lead-laced dumps in Tijuana, raising the specter of
tainted milk."'" Similarly, a 1992 EPA summary found that in
Nuevo Laredo alone, 27 million gallons per day of untreated sewage
were being discharged into the Rio Grande river.2 2 Clearly, Mexico
needs to forge a new relationship between industrialization and the
environment. Without proper precautions, industrial development on
the scale NAFTA portends could be disastrous.
From a U.S. perspective, the issue of environmental protection is
paramount because Mexican pollution does not stop at the border.
Consider the developments in just two U.S. border towns. In San
Diego, a 2.5 mile stretch of beach just north of the border has been
closed since 1980 due to the wastewater flow from Tijuana. 3 Similarly, Cameron County, a community located in the Rio Grande
river valley, has reported the highest rate of birth defects in the
United States. Between 1986 and 1991, forty-seven cases of
anencephaly, a condition where the fetus is born without a brain,
have been documented.2" In fact, the parents of eighteen Cameron
County babies recently filed a lawsuit against many of the major
maquiladoras in the area claiming that the "negligent acts and
omissions" of the maquiladorasare to blame for their children's afflictions. 25 Thus, the current state of the U.S.-Mexico border environment rings clearly in the ears of U.S. environmental groups.
NAFTA promises to significantly increase bilateral trade, and yet,
the lesson to be learned is that rapid industrialization, akin to the
maquiladora program, may have detrimental environmental consequences for those living in the border area.2" Therefore, NAFTA's
environmental provisions and those of the Environmental Side
20. Id.
21. Joe Old et al., How Do You Clean Up a 2,000-Mile Garbage Dump?, Bus.
WK., July 6, 1992, at 31.
22. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA), EPA SUMMARY: ENVIRONMENTAL
PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA, FIRST STAGE (1992-1994), at 1, 12 (1992)
[hereinafter EPA SUMMARY].
23. Id. at 12.
24. Karen Hastings, Birth Defects Blamed on Maquiladoras, EL FINANCIERO
INT'L, June 21-27, 1993, at 16.
25. Id.
26.

U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2597, POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE US.
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Agreement must enforce "sustainable" development. As will be discussed further, I believe that NAFTA will deliver.
B. Lowering Environmental Standards in the United States
The second argument raised by the environmental coalition is that
NAFTA will significantly undermine U.S. environmental standards."' By its very nature a free trade agreement eliminates barriers
to the trade of goods between nations. In contrast, environmental
standards erect barriers to the trade of goods that pose unacceptably
high risks to the environment. Therefore, the environmental coalition
fears that honoring the spirit of the agreement will dilute environmental standards and jeopardize the health of the U.S. consumer.
This argument may be supported by examining the practices of
member countries under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).28 Although GATT allows member countries to
adopt and enforce measures designed to protect human, animal, and
plant life,29 this right is qualified by two important conditions. First,
countries are expressly prohibited from using technical standards as
disguised barriers to trade.30 Second, such standards cannot be applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion. 31 Therefore, such
standards must be based on scientific evidence
and must be applied
32
equally to domestic goods and imports.
These conditions are clearly necessary to prevent countries from
using their health and environmental standards as leverage against
other member countries. On the other hand, these conditions also
give members great latitude to attack another member's standards.
For example, suppose country X and country Y are both members of
GATT. Country X then sets a standard requirement that all grapes
sold in X must be grown pesticide free to protect its citizens from
toxins. X's domestic growers use predatory insects to fight pests but
country Y's growers cannot afford to fight the pests naturally. Therefore, Y's grapes are banned in X. Although country X's standard was
intended to protect the health of Xs citizens, Y could assert a claim
ECONOMY AND SELECTED INDUSTRIES OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE-TRADE AGREE-

MENT at iii, vii (1993).

27. McKeith, supra note 17, at 207.
28. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. GATT is a multilateral trade agreement. It was established in 1948 and governs roughly 80% of world trade. For a more
detailed explanation of GATT, see Patti Goldman, The Legal Effect of Trade Agreements on Domestic Health and EnvironmentalRegulation, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 11,
12-13 (1992).
29. GATT, supra note 28, art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. GATT and Greenery: Environmental Imperialism, ECONOMIST, Feb. 15-21,
1992, at 78.
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against X that X is violating the rules of GATT because the standard treats X growers differently than Y growers. In short, the standard "unfairly discriminates" against Y's grapes. Ultimately, X may
be forced to drop this standard to remain in conformity with GATT.
A similar case occurred most recently in 1991 when the Ninth
Circuit held that Mexican fisheries violated the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA) 33 by snaring an excessive amount of unwary dolphins in their tuna nets.34 Although the importation of Mexican tuna was banned, the environmental victory was short-lived.
Mexico successfully petitioned a GATT panel to overturn the decision as violative of GATT's non-discriminatory policy because
MMPA established different standards for imported and domestically harvested tuna.35 Therefore, MMPA could not be enforced
against Mexico because it violated GATT rules.3 6 The environmental
coalition thus argues that environmental standards can be challenged
in a similar fashion under NAFTA because NAFTA adopts the language of GATT Article XX. 37 However, unlike the tuna example,
challenges raised under NAFTA might include a wide assortment of
food products. Allowing these products into U.S. markets would
jeopardize the health of the U.S. consumer.
Thus, trade agreements can fly in the face of ecological equilibrium. The examples set by the maquiladoraindustry in Mexico and
various members of GATT must be avoided. However, NAFTA is
not an ordinary trade agreement destined to follow the examples of
the past. Instead, NAFTA and its Environmental Side Agreement
are forging perhaps the first successful fusion between economic and
environmental concerns. In order to shed more light on this proposition, one must first investigate the key provisions of both NAFTA
and, more importantly, the Environmental Side Agreement.
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1376 (1988). The MMPA bans the importation of tuna from
countries that incidentally trap two times more dolphins than U.S. boats. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (1988).
34. Earth Island Inst. v. Secretary of Commerce, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991)
(finding that Mexico was in violation of the MMPA).
35. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on
United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. 21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1618 (1991).
36. Harpooned, ECONOMIST, June 27-July 3, 1992, at 78. The United States promised legislation to ensure that the ban would be dropped. Since GATT is the supreme
trade law of the land, inconsistent federal laws are invalid.
37. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art.
712(4), (6), 32 I.L.M. 289, 378 [hereinafter NAFTA, Parts 1-111] (describing the limitations to health standards as non-discriminatory and not disguised restrictions to trade).
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III. NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE AGREEMENT

NAFTA has been labelled the greenest trade agreement ever. 38
Through its preamble, annex, articles on investment and sanitary
and phytosanitary measures, and a recently signed side agreement on
the environment, NAFTA has taken unprecedented strides towards
protecting the environment. As a result, six major environmental
groups claiming 7.5 million members firmly back NAFTA. 39 However, in order to understand just how well these strides protect the
environment, the important articles of NAFTA and the Environmental Side Agreement must be evaluated.
A.

NAFTA

The first step in considering whether NAFTA is truly the green
treaty that proponents claim it to be, is to take a closer look at relevant articles of the NAFTA document itself. This analysis will begin
with the general language and effect of the NAFTA preamble and
will continue through the more specific language and effect of the
annex, as well as the articles concerning sanitary and phytosanitary
measures.
The first article of concern is the NAFTA preamble. The preamble sets the trade agreement off in an environmental as well as economic direction. Although the agreement is a commercial one, the
preamble places concern for the environment on equal footing with
the promotion of trade. For example, the parties expressly commit
not only to create an expanded market, but also to "[c]ontribute to
harmonious development," to "[s]trengthen the development and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations," and to pursue economic objectives "in a manner consistent with environmental
protection and conservation. '40 These statements are important because they establish an environmental agenda in an economic
agreement.
NAFTA also includes environmental language within its articles
on investment that should provide two important guarantees. 41 The
first guarantee gives parties the right to adopt measures "to ensure
that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner
38. Congressman Bill Richardson, Trade & Environmental Policy in Convergence:
An Assessment of NAFTA and the Compatibility of International Trade Agreements
and Environmental Protection, Presented to the GLOBE General Assembly, Tokyo, Japan, at 8 (Aug. 28, 1993) (copy on file with San Diego Law Review) ("Arguably, the
NAFTA is the most environmentally sensitive trade agreement ever ... .
39. Behr, supra note 4, at D10.
40. NAFTA, Parts I-III, supra note 37, Preamble, 32 I.L.M. at 297 (emphasis
added).
41. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art.
1114, 32 I.L.M. 605, 642 [hereinafter NAFTA, Parts IV-Annexes].
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' Specifically, so long as these
sensitive to environmental concerns." 42
measures are not disguised restrictions on trade, a party can adopt
standards "to protect human, animal or plant life or health."4
Under this guarantee, the parties can also enact regulations aimed at
"the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources." 44 The second guarantee provides that45parties cannot lower
environmental standards to attract investment.
Similarly, language found in Annex I to NAFTA also addresses
the environmental question. Take, for example, border air pollution.
Under NAFTA, trucks will not be required to switch their cargo at
the border as they had to in the past. 46 Instead, shipments will remain on the same truck for the entire journey. As a result, there
should be less congestion and thus, less air pollution at the U.S.Mexico border.
In order to allay the concern that the agreement will lower environmental standards and jeopardize the health of U.S. citizens,
47
NAFTA also devotes an article to sanitary and phytosanitary
(SPS) measures. Each party is given the right to establish sanitary
and phytosanitary measures to protect "human, animal or plant
life."'4 8 More importantly, the chosen standard can be higher than
the international requirements for the same good. 49 Assuming a
party has standards that surpass the international requirements or
norms, not only are those standards safe from challenge, but the

42. Id. art. 1114(1), 32 I.L.M. at 642.
43. Id. art. 1106(6)(a)-(b), 32 1.L.M. at 640.
44. Id. art. 1106(6)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 640.
45. Id. art. 1114(2), 32 I.L.M. at 642. "The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures." Id.
46. For example, under NAFTA, Mexican companies will be able to transport
their goods from Mexico directly into the United States. Id. Annex 1, Schedule of the
United States, Transportation, Cross-Border Services, 32 I.L.M. at 747. The Agreement
allows a person of Mexico "(a) Three years after the date of signature of this Agreement, cross-border truck services to or from border states (California, Arizona, New
Mexico, and Texas)." Id.
47. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures are those measures adopted to "protect
animal or plant life or health in its territory from risks arising from the introduction,
establishment or spread of a pest or disease." NAFTA, Parts I-III, supra note 37, art.
724, 32 I.L.M. at 382.
48. Id. art. 712(1), 32 I.L.M. at 377. "Each Party may, in accordance with this
Section, adopt, maintain or apply any sanitary or phytosanitary measure necessary for
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health in its territory . . . ." Id.
49. Id. art. 713(3), 32 I.L.M. at 378. "Nothing . . .shall prevent a Party from
adopting, maintaining or applying, in accordance with the other provisions of this Section, a sanitary or phytosanitary measure that is more stringent than the relevant international standard, guideline or recommendation." Id.
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other parties may be pressured into upgrading their own standards6 0
Therefore, like the preamble, the annex, and the articles on invest-

ment, the sanitary and phytosanitary articles help lay the foundation
for the first environmentally sensitive trade agreement. The Environ-

mental Side Agreement transforms this prelude into a functional and
efficient regulatory force.

B. The Environmental Side Agreement
Like the NAFTA preamble, the Environmental Side Agreement
begins by clearly defining what the agreement aims to achieve. The
most notable objectives of the agreement are to:
(a) foster the protection and improvement of the environment in the territories of the Parties for the well-being of present and future generations;
(b) promote sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually
supportive environmental and economic policies;
(c) increase cooperation between the Parties to better conserve, protect, and
enhance the environment ....
(f) strengthen cooperation on the development and improvement of environmental laws, regulations, procedures, policies and practices;
(g) enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental laws and
regulations ....

6) promote pollution prevention policies and practices. 51

Furthermore, the opening provisions also oblige the parties to take
certain environmentally sound actions within their own territories. 2
Although the mandates of Article 2 are quite general, Article 2's

impact should be enhanced by the more specific requirements of
later articles. For example, Article 5 not only requires the parties to
effectively enforce their environmental laws, but more importantly, it
defines how they are to do so.53 As language of the treaty, these
50. Id. art. 714(1), 32 I.L.M. at 378. "Without reducing the level of protection of
human, animal or plant life or health, the Parties shall ... pursue equivalence of their
respective sanitary and phytosanitary measures." Id. The words "without reducing the
level of protection" imply that the parties could only unify from low to high and not from
high to low.
51. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1, 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1483 [hereinafter Environmental Side
Agreement].
52. Id. art. 2(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1483. This article requires the parties to
(a) periodically prepare and make publicly available reports on the state of the
environment;
(b) develop and review environmental emergency preparedness measures;
(c) promote education in environmental matters ... ;
(d) further scientific research and technology development . .
(e) assess, as appropriate, environmental impacts; and
(f) promote the use of economic instruments for the efficient achievement of
environmental goals.
Id.

53. Id. art. 5(l), 32 I.L.M. at 1483-84. This article states that "each Party shall
effectively enforce its environmental laws." The "effective" enforcement of an environmental law is defined as:
(a) appointing and training inspectors;
1034
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requirements are binding upon the parties and must be pursued in
good faith.54
Moreover, the Environmental Side Agreement also gives the citizens of each member country the right to become a part of the enforcement effort. For example, each party must allow "interested"
persons to make a request to the appropriate governmental authorities to investigate alleged violations of an environmental regulation. 55
Furthermore, each party must also ensure that those who have
standing to sue under domestic law will be provided a judicial or
quasi-judicial proceeding to settle their claim. 56 The Environmental
Side Agreement establishes a method by which, for the first time in
a trade accord, a concerned public can play a role in enforcing the
terms of the agreement. These opening provisions, therefore, create a
basic environmental agenda and also establish concrete commitments
each party must respect.
Moving away from the opening provisions and into the substance
of the treaty, one sees that the Environmental Side Agreement
forges a reliable structure for environmental protection. The two pillars of this structure are the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and the dispute resolution mechanism. Without them,
the agreement is nothing more than another empty promise."
Environmental scholars and critics alike share the view that environmental action plans and treaties lose much of their value when an
effective monitoring and compliance regime has not been established.58 In fact, some scholars have gone as far as saying that environmental protection is doomed unless independent agencies can
(b) monitoring compliance and investigating suspected violations...
(d) publicly releasing non-compliance information; . . .
(f) promoting environmental audits;
(g) requiring record keeping and reporting;...
(i) using licenses, permits or authorizations.
Id. Failure to use any of these techniques for enforcement gives rise to the argument that
the party is not "effectively" enforcing its law. As a result, the party in question would
be in violation of the agreement.
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 321 (1987).
55. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 6(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1484
(mandating that the respective governments "shall give such requests due
consideration").
56. Id. art. 6(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1484. "Each Party shall ensure that persons with a
legally recognized interest under its law in a particular matter have appropriate access to
administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings for the enforcement of the Party's
environmental laws and regulations." Id.
57. Tom Meersman, A Green Thumbs Up?, STAR TRIB., May 31, 1993, at ID.
58. Peter L. Lallas, NAFTA and Evolving Approaches to Identify and Address
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become more involved in the regulatory process. 59 Accordingly, the

Environmental Side Agreement established the CEC.60 The Commission is an independent entity made up of a hierarchy of three
separate bodies each charged with different functions and duties: the
Council, the Secretariat, and the Joint Public Advisory Committee. 61
The first body of the CEC is the Council. The Council is an independent body made up of representatives from the political echelons
of each party.6 2 Most importantly, the drafters of the agreement

have given the Council a significantly broad environmental agenda
and, therefore, the burden of protecting the environment falls largely

on the Council. For example, the Council is empowered to oversee
the implementation of the Environmental Side Agreement,

3

address

controversies between parties, 4 oversee the Secretariat,65 develop
recommendations assessing the environmental impact of projects,66
and strengthen cooperation on the continuing improvement of environmental laws.67 Additionally, the Council will have an open channel to work with non-governmental organizations (NGOs)6 8 and
cooperatively or independently issue recommendations on a wide variety of environmental concerns. 69 Perhaps most importantly, the
"Indirect" Environmental Impacts of InternationalTrade, 5 GEo.

INT'L ENVTL L. REV.
519, 530 (1993).
59. Nicholas A. Robinson, Introduction: Emerging International Environmental
Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 229, 234 (1981).
60. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 8, 32 I.L.M. at 1485.
61. Id. art. 8(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1485.
62. Id. art. 9(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1485. This article states that members shall be
"cabinet-level or equivalent representatives of the Parties, or their designees." Id. This
structure should prevent one party from controlling the Council's decisions.
63. Id. art. 10(1)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 1485 (also stating that the Council shall "develop recommendations on the further elaboration of this Agreement").
64. Id. art. 10(l)(d), 32 I.L.M. at 1485. The Council is to "address questions and
differences that may arise between the Parties regarding the interpretation or application
of this Agreement." Id.
65. Id. art. 10(l)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 1485.
66. Id. art. 10(7), 32 I.L.M. at 1486-87. The Council must, within three years,
make recommendations regarding: "(a) assessing the environmental impact of proposed
projects . . . likely to cause significant adverse transboundary effects . . . ; (b) notification, provision of relevant information and consultation between Parties with respect to
such projects; and (c) mitigation of the potential adverse effects of such projects." Id.
67. Id. art. 10(3), 32 I.L.M. at 1486. The parties are to help each other improve
their respective environmental laws by: "(a) promoting the exchange of information on
criteria and methodologies used in establishing domestic environmental standards; and
(b) without reducing levels of environmental protection, establishing a process for developing recommendations on greater compatibility of environmental technical regulations."
Id.
68. Id. art. 9(5)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 1485. See also art. 10(6)(a), 32 T.L.M. at 1486.
69. Id. art 10(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1485-86. The Council is given the authority to
develop recommendations concerning: "(a) comparability of techniques . . . for data
gathering and analysis . . . ; (b) pollution prevention techniques and strategies . . . (g)
transboundary and border environmental issues . . . (1) environmental matters as they
relate to economic development; . . . (o) the exchange of environmental scientists and
officials; (p) approaches to environmental compliance and enforcement." Id.
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Council is charged with monitoring the environmental effects of
NAFTA. 7 °
The second body of the CEC is the Secretariat. The Secretariat
serves two functions. First, the Secretariat acts as the Council's supporting cast by providing technical and operational assistance to the
Council, and any working group created by the Council. 1 The idea
is to make the CEC a more efficient organization by creating a specialized subgroup to handle all of the time-intensive tasks such as
compiling data, developing statistics, and issuing reports. By placing
this burden on an independent entity, the Council can allocate the
resources saved towards fulfilling its considerable mandate. The end
result should be a more efficient monitoring system.
The Secretariat's second function is to monitor the parties and
evaluate their compliance with the agreement. 712 The Secretariat has

two means to achieve this end. When a party or NGO claims that a
particular party is failing to enforce its environmental regulations,

the Secretariat is empowered to develop a factual record.7 3 This record is to contain any information relevant to the controversy 74 and

shall be kept on file with the Council for further consideration.7 5
Thus, subject to the Commission's approval, the Secretariat can independently investigate a party's performance. Since treaty benefits
can be suspended should this investigation uncover any violations,

the maintenance
of a factual record is an extremely important
76
function.
The Secretariat can also monitor a party's performance by addressing such in its annual report.7 7 The annual report covers actions

70. Id. art. 10 (6)(d), 32 I.L.M. at 1486.
71. Id. art. 11(5), 32 I.L.M. at 1487.
72. Id. arts. 12, 15, 32 I.L.M. at 1487, 1488-89.
73. Id. art. 15, 32 I.L.M. at 1488-89.
74. Id. art. 15(4), 32 I.L.M. at 1489. This article establishes that the factual record can contain any information "publicly available ... submitted by interested nongovernmental organizations ... or ... developed by the Secretariat." Id.
75. Id. art. 15(5)-(6), 32 I.L.M. at 1489. A final factual record shall be submitted
to the Council. Also, it is important to note that the Council can make this record publicly available. See id. art. 15(7), 32 I.L.M. at 1489.
76. An arbitration panel should refer to this factual record in deciding whether
there has been a violation. See infra notes 93-106 (discussing dispute resolution).
77. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 12(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1487.
The Secretariat shall prepare an annual report to be reviewed and considered by the
Council and made publicly available.
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each party has taken to honor the agreement, 78 views and informa-

tion submitted by NGOs,79 and any other relevant information the
Council wishes to be included. 0 This report must also periodically
address the state of the environment in each party's territory. 8'
Thus, the Secretariat's role is to serve as an assistant to the Council

as well as an independent monitor of party actions and possible
treaty violations. Again, the importance of these duties is that they
provide the CEC with a mechanism for monitoring compliance with
the treaty. Given appropriate funding, the Secretariat should become

a highly specialized and efficient monitoring mechanism. As an effective monitor, the Secretariat will take much of the burden of

monitoring off of NGOs, giving the NGOs more time to advance
political campaigns and apply public pressure to bring non-complying parties into compliance. 82
The third and final body within the CEC is the Joint Public Advisory Committee. As its name indicates, the primary responsibility of
this Committee is to provide additional support to the Council
through advisory meetings concerning any matter within the scope of
the agreement.8 3 By providing additional input, this Committee
makes the CEC stronger as a whole. 4 Also, given its independence85
and obligation to help provide technical information,86 the Joint Public Advisory Committee contributes to the fQrmation of a legitimate
regulatory scheme.87 Thus, the Joint Public Advisory Committee fits
78. Id. art. 12(2)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 1487. Such actions should include data regarding a party's environmental enforcement efforts.
79. Id. art. 12(2)(d), 32 I.L.M. at 1487.
80. Id. art. 12(2)(f), 32 I.L.M. at 1487.
81. Id. art. 12(3), 32 I.L.M. at 1487.
82. Developments in the Law - InternationalEnvironmental Law, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1484, 1565 (1991) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. The author discusses the
important role that the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Secretariat has played in monitoring compliance, which has gone a long way towards the overall success of its environmental agenda. Further, "[b]y reducing NGOs' costs for
gathering and analyzing information, international agencies can enable these organizations to spend more resources on publicity campaigns and direct political pressure. Public
embarrassment can be more easily brought to bear on states that are not complying with
environmental treaties if data on compliance is readily available." Id.
83. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 16, 32 I.L.M. at 1489.
This article allows the Joint Public Advisory Committee to advise the Council and "perform such other functions as the Council may direct." Id. art. 16(4), 32 I.L.M. at 1489.

84. See

generally JAMES L. GIBSON ET AL., ORGANIZATIONS: BEHAVIOR, STRUC-

PROcEss 277 (1991) (proposing that a group functions more effectively due to the
input of different members of the group).
85. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 16(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1489.
The Joint Public Advisory Committee is made up of an equal number of members from
each party and is therefore not subject to being controlled by a single party.
86. Id. art. 16(5), 32 I.L.M. at 1489. The Committee can provide technical information to the Secretariat to help prepare a factual record.
87. Peter S. Smedresman, Note, The International Joint Commission (United
States-Canada)and the InternationalBoundary and Water Commission (United StatesMexico): Potentialfor Environmental Control Along the Boundaries, 6 N YU. J. INT'L
TURE.
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squarely into the framework created by the drafters of the Environmental Side Agreement. The Committee buffers the CEC with technical support, spreading the costs evenly across agencies and
ultimately contributing to a solid model for regulating compliance.
Having stated its environmental goals and having established committees to pursue those goals, the Environmental Side Agreement
takes the unprecedented step of creating a process to handle those
parties that refuse to live up to their obligations under the accord.
This dispute resolution mechanism is designed to settle the conflict in
as mutually acceptable a manner as possible. However, as will become apparent, the procedure also has the teeth necessary to command compliance. Due to the complexity of this mechanism, a
hypothetical example should be helpful in clarifying how the Environmental Side Agreement's dispute resolution mechanism works.
Suppose that in 1980, Tox-In, a U.S. company, established a manufacturing base in Tijuana for the production of telephone receivers.
In order for the receivers to function properly, chemical lubricants
are added during production to each part. As a result of this process,
toxic byproducts are released which must be disposed of. Although
Mexican law requires Tox-In to ship these byproducts back to the
United States, Tox-In has been dumping them into the Tijuana river
instead. Furthermore, Tox-In has also violated Mexican federal law
by failing to keep a record of its disposal techniques. Tox-In has
never been fined nor otherwise penalized and continues to make its
byproducts mysteriously disappear.
With the passage of NAFTA and the Environmental Side Agreement, Tox-In's dumping practice might be brought to an end in two
ways. First, through article six of the Environmental Side Agree-

ment, an "interested" person could request the Secretariat of Social
Development (SEDESOL)8 8 officials to investigate Tox-In's dumping

practice.8 9 If SEDESOL completes its investigation and finds Tox-In

L. & POL. 499, 512 (1973). The author believes that a regulatory agency is superior to
other forms of control such as administrative proceedings. The strength of a regulatory
agency specialized in handling the environment is thaf it can "consider a bewildering
variety of factors-technical, political, economic, social and diplomatic-which come into
play." Id.
88. SEDESOL is the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and is the successor to the Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE). Terzan N. Lewis, Comment, Environmental Law in Mexico, 21 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y, 159 n.* (1992).
89. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 6(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1484.
This article states that "[e]ach Party shall ensure that interested persons may request the
Party's competent authorities to investigate alleged violations of its environmental laws
1039

to be in violation of Mexican law, the complaining party must be
provided a remedy in accordance with that party's laws.90 Although
Mexican law would not, as yet, allow the citizens of Mexico to sue
Tox-In,9 1 under Mexican law, Tox-In could be fined, its CEOs arrested, or forced to dispose of its byproducts legally or suffer permanent closure. 92
Second, if Tox-In's solvents were finding their way into air and
water in the United States, the United States could request a consultation with Mexico.93 This consultation would follow the procedures

enumerated for dispute resolution and would ultimately force Mexico to crackdown on Tox-In and similar offenders. Although the
United States cannot directly enforce Mexico's environmental regulations by its own hand,94 the dispute resolution procedures achieve
the same end through mutually acceptable means. The only constraint on the United States' ability to make such a request is the
requirement that Mexico's nonenforcement be a sustained and recurring course of action and not a result of reasonable regulatory discretion or resource allocation to environmental matters of a higher
priority than this incident of illegal dumping. 5 In the case of ToxIn, and the many other cases like it, six years of illegal dumping
should easily meet this threshold requirement because of the nature
and duration of the violation. 9" Thus, under the dispute resolution
provisions, the United States and Mexico might convene to find a
mutually 97acceptable solution, and put an end to Tox-In's dumping
practices.

and regulations." Id.
90. Id. art. 6(3), 32 I.L.M. at 1484. This section recognizes the complaining
party's right to "sue another person under that Party's jurisdiction ... seek sanctions or
remedies such as monetary penalties, emergency closures." Id. art. 6(3)(a)-(b), 32
I.L.M. 1484.
91. Carl F. Schwenker, Note, Protecting the Environment and U.S. Competitiveness in the Era of Free Trade: A Proposal,71 TEx. L. REv. 1355, 1367 (1993).
92. Lewis, supra note 88, at 177. "Non-compliance can result in ... fines, varying
degrees of closure, to an administrative arrest of up to 36 hours." Id.
93. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 22(1), 32 1.L.M. at 1490.
"Any Party may request in writing consultations with any other Party regarding....
failure by that other Party to effectively enforce its environmental law." Id.
94. Id. art. 37, 32 I.L.M. at 1494. "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to empower a Party's authorities to undertake environmental law enforcement activities
in the territory of another Party." Id. To allow this would violate party sovereignty.
95. Id. art. 45(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1494. A party has not violated its obligation to
enforce its environmental laws if nonenforcement is due to: "(a) a reasonable exercise of
their discretion in respect of investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory or compliance matters; or (b) bona fide decisions to allocate resources to enforcement in respect of the
environmental matters determined to have higher priorities." Id. (emphasis added).
96. Allowing six years of illegal dumping would probably not be considered a "reasonable" exercise of discretion. Similarly, a consistent lack of enforcement would probably not qualify as reasonable either.
97. Id. art. 22(4), 32 I.L.M. at 1490. So long as Mexico's infraction qualifies as a
persistent pattern of nonenforcement, the "Parties shall make every attempt to arrive at
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A problem might arise, however, should Mexico, for economic or
other reasons, refuse to acquiesce to the U.S. demands to shut down
Tox-In's illegal dumping practices. The agreement confronts this

problem head on by establishing deadlines for a joint resolution. If
the dispute has not been resolved by the target date, intervention by
independent agencies of the accord automatically occurs. For exam-

ple, Article 23 provides for a special session of the Council to be
called when the two parties have been unable to reach an agreement

within sixty days.98 The Council's function is to help parties break
the gridlock through mediation, expert advice, and appropriate
recommendations.99
Should further delays prevent the United States and Mexico from
reaching a mutually acceptable solution within sixty days of the

Council's intervention, an arbitration panel will be called to settle

the case once and for all.' 0 0 The arbitration panel's function is to
bring the parties to resolve the dispute themselves. However, unlike

the Council, the arbitration panel is not left powerless against a
stalemate. If the parties cannot resolve their dispute, the panel is

empowered to make findings of fact to determine whether the party
complained against has persistently failed to enforce its environmen-

tal regulations, and if so, the panel will order the violating party to
adopt a plan for enforcing their laws. 0 1 Failure to adopt the panel's

action plan, or one the parties themselves agree on, 102 reconvenes the
a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter through consultations." Id.
98. Id. art. 23(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
99. Id. art. 23(4), 32 I.L.M. at 1490. The Council, upon intervention, can: "(a)
call in such technical advisers or create such working groups or expert groups as it deems
necessary, (b) have recourse to ... mediation or such other dispute resolution procedures, or (c) make recommendations, as may assist the consulting Parties to reach a
mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute." Id.
100. Id. art. 24(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1490. The arbitration panel will be called after 60
days and with a two-thirds vote of the Council, so long as the nonenforcement of Mexican law involves "workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or provide
services." Id.
101. Id. art. 31(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1492. Within 180 days of conception, the panel is
to present a report to the parties containing:
(a) findings of fact;
(b) its determination as to whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure ... to effectively enforce its environmental law ... ; and
(c) in the event the panel makes an affirmative determination under subparagraph (b), its recommendations ... for the resolution of the dispute ... normally shall be that the Party complained against . . . implement an action
plan sufficient to remedy the pattern of non-enforcement.

Id.

102. Id. art. 33, 32 I.L.M. at 1492. "[T]he disputing Parties may agree on a mutually satisfactory action plan, which normally shall conform with the determinations and
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panel.' 03 At this point, the panel decides whether the party has im-

plemented the chosen action plan, and if not, the panel will be forced
to flex its muscle by assessing fines against the non-complying
party
04

and requiring full implementation of the proposed plan.1

Assuming fines are levied against Mexico and a full implementa-

tion of the action plan is required, the Environmental Side Agreement does not rely on Mexico's good faith in making sure that the

plan is finally put into action. For example, should the United States
find itself still bothered by Tox-In's wastewater several months later,
the United States can bring the panel back yet again to investigate
whether Mexico did indeed put the proposed plan into action as
agreed. 05 A finding of anything less than full compliance with the
action plan and complete payment of the fines provides the complaining party its biggest stick: suspension of NAFTA benefits. 10
Because a party can hardly afford to lose $20 million per year for
any reason, the threat of suspension and the actual suspension in fact
of NAFTA benefits should bring a quick and final end to the matter.

IV.

ANALYSIS

NAFTA articles regarding the environment and the Environmental Side Agreement should allow NAFTA to respond strongly to the
criticisms that the trade agreement will result in reckless development and lower environmental protection. As will be discussed further, these articles each contribute toward making NAFTA a model
for future trade negotiators to use in reaching an equilibrium between economic development and environmental protection. Perhaps
most important is the fact that NAFTA language is binding on the
parties. As part of the treaty this language becomes the highest law
of the land, overriding any conflicting domestic legislation. 01 Thus,
recommendations of the panel." Id.
103. Id. art. 34(I)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 1492. If the parties have not agreed on an
action plan or have an action plan but cannot agree on whether the chosen action plan is
being implemented, "any disputing Party may request that the panel be reconvened." Id.
104. Id. art. 34(6), 32 I.L.M. at 1493. Reconvening the panel results in the party
complained against being fined and ordered to implement its action plan or an action
plan created by the panel. Furthermore, "any such provision shall be final." Id.
105. Id. art. 35, 32 I.L.M. at 1493. One-hundred eighty days after the panel imposes fines and orders the adoption of the action plan, "[a] complaining Party may...
request in writing that a panel be reconvened to determine whether the Party complained
against is fully implementing the action plan." Id.
106. Id. art. 36, 32 I.L.M. at 1493. NAFTA benefits can be suspended by as much
as $20 million per year or .007 % of the total trade in goods between the parties the past
year until the offending party comes into compliance. Id. Annex 34(1), 32 I.L.M. at
1493.
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111(1) (1987). This section states that "international agreements of the
United States are law of the United States and supreme over the law of the several
States." Id.
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by making environmental protection a goal of the treaty, each member is held to pursuing that goal' 0 8 and can suffer the ultimate penalty of suspension of benefits for noncompliance.1 0 9 Bearing this
important point in mind, a more accurate assessment of NAFTA
and the Environmental Side Agreement can now be made.
A.

NAFTA

As the starting point for the agreement, the preamble shall also be
the first NAFTA article to be analyzed. The most positive aspect of
the preamble is that environmental protection is firmly established as
a goal of the agreement. Indeed, equal weight is given to environmental protection and promotion of trade. Although NAFTA is
technically a "trade" agreement, the environment will not be taking
a back seat to economic concerns.
On the other hand, the preamble is weak because it does not seem
to bind the parties to anything quantifiable. It will be difficult, if not
impossible, to determine when a party is acting in a manner inconsistent with environmental conservation and protection unless the
party's actions are grossly out of line." 0 This weakness is not fatal,
however, because the agreement does go into greater detail in each
of the other pertinent sections. Thus, the preamble does a good job
of making the environment a priority and leaving it up to the other
articles to fill in the details.
The NAFTA provisions for the environment answer some of the
questions posed by critics and those questions left unanswered by the
preamble. The declarations of these articles contain several key commitments that should have a significant impact on strengthening environmental protection and easing environmentalists' fears. First, one
of the most notable improvements contributed by these articles is
that they go a long way toward eliminating the possibility that
108. Id. § 321. "Every international agreement in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Id. Because NAFTA has been
approved by the appropriate legislative bodies of all three countries, the agreement is in
force and binding.
109. Id. § 335(2). "A material breach of a multilateral agreement by one of the
parties entitles (a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of
Id. Under NAFTA, the same
the agreement in whole or in part or to terminate it ....
principles govern, but efforts to reconcile the conflict must first be made by the parties.
110. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1555. The author states that a
less effective environmental agreement is one that "creates few concrete obligations and
merely pronounces a vague commitment to address broad environmental concerns." Id.
The language of the preamble, when viewed in isolation of the other sections, really
doesn't commit the parties to much.
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NAFTA will reduce the quality of goods entering the United States.
By reaffirming the U.S. government's right to reject goods that do
not meet its standards, all goods entering the United States must
meet U.S. health standards to gain access to U.S. markets.
In addition, NAFTA will not lead to the weakening of health
standards because these articles permit parties to raise the level of
their own standards. This allowance runs directly against the most
recent trends in international trade in which countries are encouraged to lower their standards to a less restrictive international
level so as to provide for maximum free trade.11 By allowing the
parties to raise their standards above international levels, a traditional tool used to defeat strict health standards is lost. 12 Although
NAFTA is founded on GATT principles, challenges to strict environmental standards will meet a different fate under NAFTA." 3
Finally, the environmental provisions take a big step in the right
direction toward fostering strict environmental standards by not allowing parties to lower their standards as a means of attracting foreign investment."' Thus, the concerns that U.S. corporations will
flee to Mexico to take advantage of relaxed environmental enforcement are overstated. Although Mexico may choose not to enforce its
environmental laws in order to invite greater investment in its country, such a lowering of environmental standards is sanctionable
under NAFTA. Therefore, if U.S. corporations relocate to Mexico to
take advantage of continued relaxed enforcement of federal environmental regulations, Mexico will be in violation of the treaty and subject to sanctions.
The NAFTA sanitary and phytosanitary article should also be
quite effective in preventing the erosion of health standards. Mexico,
the United States, and Canada are afforded the unprecedented opportunity to establish health-related import requirements that can be
stricter than international norms for the same product. This is a significant departure from the policy of Article XX of GATT, where
111. Goldman, supra note 28, at 13. The author states that "[e]arly GATT negotiations and trade disputes focused on reducing tariff rates. . . . In the past two decades,
however, GATT negotiations and disputes have begun to focus on . . . many domestic
programs and laws that protect health or the environment." Id. (footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 13-20. The author explains that most countries whose products are
banned from sale in a particular country due to the product's failure to meet a prescribed
health standard often successfully defeat the standard as unjustifiably excessive under
GATT rules, which prevent the "unjustifiable" discrimination between goods. NAFTA
justifies high standards, thus defeating this argument.
113. NAFTA, Parts I-III, supra note 37, arts. 101-103(2), 32 I.L.M. at 287. Articles 101 and 102 specifically cite GATT and provide that the parties maintain their
rights under GATT. However, Article 103(2) states that "[i]n the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and such other agreements, this Agreement shall prevail."
Id. art. 103(2), 32 I.L.M. at 297. Thus, the more liberal NAFTA rules will govern disputes under the agreement.
114. NAFTA, Part IV-Annexes, supra note 41, art. 1114(2), 32 I.L.M. at 642.
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the right to impose environmental standards is allowed but is implicitly limited to international levels.115 However, NAFTA is consistent
with GATT in that a domestic standard must not discriminate
among goods or act as a disguised restraint on trade.' 16 Once again,
a highly plausible result of this interplay between NAFTA and
GATT is that challenges to environmental standards under NAFTA
would be less successful. Since each NAFTA party has the right to
adopt standards that surpass international requirements, a high standard is no longer immediately suspected to be a discriminatory
one. 117 Moreover, it would be difficult to argue that such a standard
would constitute a disguised restriction on trade when the NAFTA
treaty explicitly grants the right to enact such a standard. Thus, a
country's uniquely high environmental standards would be given
greater resiliency under NAFTA.
Furthermore, parties are charged with the objective of making
their SPS measures equivalent to those of the other parties." 8 When
read together with the previous articles on the environment, which
generally encourage an upward harmonization, this equivalency requirement should cause SPS levels to unify at the highest level of
enforcement, thus avoiding a negative, downward harmonization.
Therefore, the entire thrust of the SPS and environmental articles
seems to be aimed at eliminating the traditional trade agreement
vice. Under NAFTA, environmental standards will not be diluted.
B.

The Environmental Side Agreement

The next issue to consider in weighing the substance of the environmental critique of NAFTA is whether the Environmental Side
Agreement can serve adequately as the policing agent it is meant to
115. GATT, supra note 28, art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. Article
XX states only that a party can adopt and enforce measures that are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health." Id. NAFTA goes beyond this by allowing a
party to set such standards at uniquely high levels if the party so desires. See supra notes
47-50 and accompanying text.
116. NAFrA, Parts I-III, supra note 37, art. 712(4), 32 I.L.M. at 378. "Each
Party shall ensure that a sanitary or phytosanitary measure that it adopts . . . does not
arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between its goods and like goods of another
Party." Id. Compare this with GATT Article XX which requires that "such measures
are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination." GATT, supra note 28, art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
117. NAFTA, Parts I-III, supra note 37, art. 713(3), 32 I.L.M. at 378.
118. Id. art. 714(1), 32 I.L.M. at 378. This article calls for standards to be uniform between the parties but does not allow "reducing the level of protection of human,
animal or plant life or health." Id.
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be. Critics have argued that the Environmental Side Agreement
lacks an aggressive, well-supported enforcement mechanism and
therefore holds little promise.119 However, by examining the articles
concerning the objectives, obligations, organizations, and enforcement of the agreement, the truth of the matter should become more
evident. The addition of the Environmental Side Agreement to an
already environmentally sensitive NAFTA will create the most environmentally conscious trade agreement ever negotiated, and should
begin a dramatic change in how the world views Mexico and trade
agreements in general. 120
The first aspect of the Environmental Side Agreement that should
be examined is the nature of the commitments and obligations to
which the parties are bound. As previously mentioned, the Environmental Side Agreement establishes an agenda which is intended to
guide future actions by21U.S., Mexican, and Canadian traders, investors, or entrepreneurs.
Although critics might argue that the language of Article 1 is too
vague to offer any real promise, 2 this article, just like the NAFTA
preamble, must be looked at in the context of the entire agreement.
This article was intended to be vague because, as the first article in
the agreement, its function is simply to establish the general principles and themes of the agreement. Certainly,
if the agreement had
23
stopped here, it would be worth very little.
However, the agreement contains subsequent articles that should
satisfy this scrutiny. Article 1 must be read together with the express
obligations of the parties set forth in Part 2 of the agreement, which
establishes an even more aggressive environmental framework. Specifically, each party is obligated to honor the commitments of three
important articles concerning environmental protection. First, in regard to its own territory, each party must: periodically issue public
reports on the state of the environment, develop and review emergency preparedness measures, promote environmental education and
scientific research, and assess the environmental impacts of investment projects.124 The parties are also required to "effectively" enforce their environmental laws by appointing inspectors, monitoring
119. Jeff Faux, The Failed Casefor NAFTA, BRIEFING PAPER (Economics Policy
Inst., Washington, D.C.), June 1993, at 13-14.
120. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NAFTA SUPPLEMENTAL:
AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 1 (1993).
121. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1483.
This article establishes the objectives of the agreement.
122. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1555-56 (arguing that vague
commitments to "reduce pollution" or "preserve nature" prevent an agreement from
"making a substantial contribution to environmental protection").
123. Id.
124. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 2(1)(a)-(e), 32 I.L.M. at
1483.
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compliance, encouraging audits, and requiring record keeping and
reporting.' Thus, it is important to note that, unlike well-meaning
yet ineffective environmental agreements of the past, the Environmental Side Agreement avoids the notorious pitfall of speaking in
such general terms that the terms themselves are meaningless. 1 26
In the case of Mexico, these articles strike at the heart of the
loudest environmental complaint, that Mexico doesn't enforce its environmental laws. By requiring Mexican authorities to "monitor
compliance" and "appoint inspectors," the Environmental Side
Agreement commands Mexico to enforce its own laws.12 7 Mexico
will now be in violation of an international treaty if nonenforcement
continues. This is important because, as a party to the treaty, the
United States would be given the right to suspend benefits to Mexico
in response to such a violation.'2 " In all likelihood, Mexico would
rather spend more money on enforcement than suffer a suspension of
the benefits it so deeply covets.
Finally, the opening provisions of the Environmental Side Agreement reinforce NAFTA's stance against reducing environmental
standards. The Environmental Side Agreement takes the important
step of recognizing the right of each party to establish their own
desired levels of environmental protection. 2 9 This step is significant
because it should prevent challenges to strict environmental standards from having any success in lowering those standards. In the
past tough environmental standards were challenged under GATT
Article XX. The challenge under GATT has been that a certain
high standard is a disguised restriction on trade, 3 ° and, therefore,
must be removed. However, because the Environmental Side Agreement restates NAFTA's right to impose standards of a party's

125. Id. art. 5, 32 I.L.M. at 1483-84. This article states that "each Party shall
effectively enforce its environmental laws" and also lists various activities governments
can undertake towards that end. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Compare the language of the Environmental Side Agreement with that of the
Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection, May 23, 1972,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., arts. 1-3, 23 U.S.T. 845, 847-48. Phrases in the latter agreement include,
"[a]ttaching great importance to the problems of environmental protection." Id. at 846.
127. Assuming Mexico continued to avoid enforcing its environmental regulations,
the language of Articles 2 and 5 of the agreement arguably place Mexico in violation of
the treaty and subject to sanctions. Thus, Mexico now has a greater incentive to comply.
See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
129. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1483.
This article addresses the levels of protection allowable under the agreement.
130. GATT and Greenery: Environmental Imperialism, supra note 32, at 78.
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choice, even if those standards surpass international norms,'131 excessively high standards should be presumptively legitimate. This is not
to say that the standard can never be a disguised barrier to trade.
Rather, the point is that by reiterating the right of NAFTA parties
to establish uniquely high standards, the task of proving that a standard is a disguised restraint on trade becomes much more difficult.
Thus, with the Environmental Side Agreement reinforcing
NAFTA's language on the issue, challenges to environmental standards will be less successful.
Unlike the positive strides made by the opening provisions of the
Environmental Side Agreement, Article 6 of the agreement does little to advance environmental protection. Article 6 claims to provide
private access to remedies for violations of environmental laws. 132
This provision does not change anything because domestic law still
controls.' 33 Thus, citizens in the United States already have such access and Mexican law does not allow private citizens to sue for violations of Mexico's environmental law. 134 Therefore, this article,
though seemingly helpful, offers very little promise.
The next point of inquiry is the CEC. Comprised of a Council,
Secretariat, and Joint Public Advisory Committee, the CEC gives
the agreement some important strengths, but also has some noticeable weaknesses.
To begin with, the Council has been given powers which are not
only significant in scope, but are also important because they correspond to the types of powers an international agency needs in order
to make an effective stand for environmental protection. For example, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
found that in order to successfully protect the environment, a green
treaty had to establish a central body responsible for coordinating
environmental work and managing environmental resources. '3 The
Council seems to strongly reflect this principle by taking charge of
coordinating environmental regulation, promoting cooperation, and
131. NAFrA, Parts I-III, supra note 37, art. 713(3), 32 I.L.M. at 378.
132. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 6(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1484.
"Each Party shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest under its law in
a particular matter have appropriate access to administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial
proceedings for the enforcement of the Party's environmental laws and regulations." Id.
133. Only those with a legally recognized interest under that Party's law are given
standing. Id.
134. Schwenker, supra note 91, at 1367. "Mexico's environmental laws do not allow for citizen suits for environmental protection, one of the most important and effective
provisions of U.S. environmental laws." Id.
135. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, 11
I.L.M. 1416, 1423. The conference recommends entrusting "the over-all responsibility
. . to any central body that may be given the co-ordinating authority in the field of the
environment." See also Principle 17 which directs this central authority to "managing or
controlling the environmental resources of States with the view to enhancing environmental quality." Id. at 1419.
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36
generally handling the implementation of the agreement.1

Furthermore, in order to be successful, a regulatory agency must

also promote environmental training and education, establish strong
37
communication networks, and facilitate a transfer of technology.

The NAFTA Council has each of these revered traits. To promote
training, the Council can make recommendations for "human re-

source training and development in the environmental field.'

38 Sim-

ilarly, to establish strong communication networks, the Council

promotes public access to information on the state of the environment, "'

and provides for NGO input 4 0 in order to give the Council

a broader range of support and legitimacy.' 41 Finally, to facilitate
technology transfers, the Council can recommend the exchange of

environmental scientists

42 and

can conduct studies to compare tech-

niques for data gathering and analysis. 43 Once again, the Council

has been given powers that some scholars argue are vital to the suc-

cess of a regulatory scheme.' 4 4 Thus, as the first body of the CEC,

the Council will shoulder the burden of managing the environmental
concerns and orchestrating the application of the agreement's provi-

sions from theory to practice. Although time will truly tell how successful the Council will be, the CEC's first step is a respectable one.
136. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 10, 32 I.L.M. at 1485.
See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
137. Paul R. Muldoon, The International Law of Ecodevelopment: Emerging
Norms for Development Assistance Agencies, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1,38-39 (1986). Mentioning these features as the most important aspects of a multilateral donor's regulatory
agency, "successful international ecodevelopment requires major coordinated programs
to address problems such as . . . deforestation, soil loss .... A multitude of sources
support this ecodevelopment norm." Id. (emphasis added).
138. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 10(2)(n), 32 I.L.M. at
1486.
139. Id. art. 10(5)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 1486.
140. Id. arts. 9(5)(b), 10(6)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 1485-86.
141. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1575. By tapping into NGOs, the
agreement helps foster environmental education and ethics at the local level. This is important in countries such as Mexico where the local populations contribute to environmental degradation because they lack the information necessary to make an informed
decision.
142. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 10(2)(o), 32 I.L.M. at
1486.
143. Id. art. 10(2)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 1485.
144. Developments in the Law, supra note 82, at 1565. By placing much of the
monitoring burden on an independent NAFTA agency, parties can "shift resources to
other priorities and at the same time allow NGOs and environmental groups to monitor
treaty compliance." Also, "[b]y reducing NGOs' costs for gathering and analyzing information, international agencies can enable these organizations to spend more resources on
publicity campaigns and direct political pressure," thereby increasing the likelihood that
the agreement will be effective in protecting the environment. Id.
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The final two agencies, the Secretariat and the Joint Public Advisory Committee, are primarily charged with providing support to the
Council, and therein lies their importance. With the tremendous increase in trade and investment activities that will undoubtedly proceed from NAFTA, assigning the task of tracking the environmental
ramifications of such activity to one body alone would be ludicrous.
By delegating duties among three bodies, the CEC should be more
adequately prepared to handle its regulatory task.
On the other hand, the CEC does have two flaws worth noting.
First, the CEC may be hindered by the apparent lack of a binding
agenda. The agreement gives most of the regulatory power to the
Council and yet, many of the important duties appear to be optional.
For example, Article 10(2) provides a long list of what the Council
"may consider, and develop recommendations regarding." 14" A
stronger agency could have been created had the Council been required to pursue one or more of the activities described.
Second, the CEC will inevitably create a various array of
problems due to its size and complexity. The CEC could become a
bureaucratic nightmare. Despite the strength in delegation, trying to
coordinate the activities of three distinct government bodies, each
with representatives from different countries, speaking different languages, and following different cultural guidelines could prove to be
more difficult than protecting the environment itself. Indeed, the
CEC might never get to its environmental agenda. Thus, although
the CEC is undoubtedly needed to bring NAFTA's environmental
pledges into action, the CEC's effectiveness will be hampered by
weaknesses common to bureaucratic bodies.
Standing beside the question of whether the Environmental Side
Agreement can effectively regulate party activities is the issue of
whether the Environmental Side Agreement can adequately enforce
its agenda through its dispute resolution mechanism. Although critics claim this mechanism has no real power to enforce the agreement, the dispute resolution article has several notable assets.
First, by linking treaty benefits with environmental compliance,
the Environmental Side Agreement creates a powerful tool to manhandle parties into compliance. No other trade agreement in history
has ever levied sanctions against parties for not enforcing their environmental laws.' 46
Furthermore, by establishing an independent dispute resolution

145. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 10(2), 32 I.L.M. at 148586. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
146. The Great NAFTA Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1993, at C3.
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process, NAFTA avoids the pitfall of having to refer to an international court for a remedy. Since such international courts have consensual jurisdiction only, the NAFTA Side Agreement eliminates
the polluting party's ability to sidestep sanctions by not consenting to
adjudication.141 Therefore, by establishing its own dispute resolution
mechanism with automatic jurisdiction over environmental disputes,
the agreement goes a long way toward removing the skepticism that
the treaty's environmental language will be ignored.
On the other hand, the dispute resolution procedures can only be
activated by a "persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained
against to effectively enforce its environmental law."' 4" Arguably, a
high threshold is created because a controversy does not arise until a
pattern of nonenforcement exists. Thus, a party that allows occasional, sporadic violations of its environmental laws could probably
escape sanction. However, the type of action that is addressed is that
which has proven to be a problem in the past. Specifically, the preNAFTA complaint was that Mexico consistently failed to enforce its
environmental regulations. Therefore, the dispute resolution article
focuses on eliminating this behavior. Although a pattern of nonenforcement is required, this is the type of behavior that NAFTA
should seek to prevent. Cases of sporadic and inconsistent enforcement pale in comparison to the problem of consistent and regular
nonenforcement. Thus, this article should not be disparaged for attacking the very problem environmentalists complained about in the
past. By granting the power to hear disputes and levy sanctions, the
dispute resolution articles should make a powerful contribution to
the new regulatory climate created by NAFTA.
C. Independent Environmental Trends in Mexico
Although the analysis to this point has focused on the ability of
NAFTA and the Environmental Side Agreement to achieve environmentally responsible development, we now direct our attention to
Mexico's ever-increasing environmental awareness and responsibility.
147. Robinson, supra note 59, at 252. Robinson states that "[a]ny new institutional arrangement would offer a better opportunity for avoiding major environmental
hazards than would resort to traditional adjudications." Id. Additionally, referring a dispute to the International Court of Justice is a losing proposition because the court has no
power "unless the two states both accept the Court's jurisdiction." Id.
148. Environmental Side Agreement, supra note 51, art. 28(3), 32 I.L.M. at 1491.
A panel can be convened only for this purpose, "[u]nless the disputing parties otherwise
agree." Id. "'[P]ersistent pattern' means a sustained or recurring course of action or
inaction." Id. art. 45(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1495.

1051

Few have considered the role Mexico has played, independent of
NAFTA, to ensure that modernization and industrialization come
without ecological desecration. With an eye keenly focused on becoming a first-world nation, Mexico has done more in the past few
years to prove that it is ready to become environmentally responsible
than either the United States or Canada. Perhaps unfairly, the Mexican achievements have gone without notice or have been noticed but
disregarded as political ploys to influence the U.S. congressional
vote. This claim would seem to make sense if Mexico had simply
made a few last-minute plant closures or timely speeches. However,
such is not the case. 149 Mexico has made a 180-degree turn in both
attitude and action, raising the argument that regardless of the
NAFTA language, industries will not exploit Mexico's environment
because Mexico itself will not allow them to do so. This proposition
should become clearer by reviewing some of the steps Mexico has
taken and is taking to become its own environmental watchdog.
One of the most promising changes made in the past decade has
been the adoption of a federal environmental law. The General Law
of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (GLEEEP)
was put into action in 1988 and is patterned after federal environmental laws of the United States. 50 GLEEEP establishes technical
standards to protect the air, water, soil, fauna, and plant life of Mexico. All manufacturers must meet these standards in order to procure
an operating license.'" Furthermore, hazardous waste producers
must comply with tracking and testing standards and report on the
use and disposal of these materials." 2 Those companies generating
hazardous waste from products imported for industrial use under the
maquiladora program must return the waste to the country of origin."5" Thus, GLEEEP gives Mexico a legal structure for the protection of the environment of first-world status.
Moreover, although enforcement has been slow in coming, recent
developments provide some promise that GLEEEP might finally become a legitimate legal regime. For example, despite its pressing
149. EPA SUMMARY, supra note 22, at 12. Mexico's environmental commitment
dates back to 1944 with the formation of the International Boundary and Water Commission to handle water sanitation along the border. Also, in 1983 Mexico signed the
Integrated Environmental Plan for the U.S.-Mexico Border Area. The plan focuses on
making comprehensive improvements to the border regions.
150. Feeley & Knier, supra note 3, at 281-82.
151. McKeith, supra note 17, at 189-90.
152. Id. at 189-91. Hazardous waste operators must, among other things, obtain a
license from SEDUE, file an environmental impact statement, and file biannual reports
on any waste that is stored. SEDUE is now replaced by SEDESOL and is Mexico's
version of the EPA. See supra note 88.
153. McKeith, supra note 17, at 191. "Mexican law prohibits the importation of
hazardous waste unless it can be recycled or reused." Id.
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lack of funding, the Mexican government closed 82 industrial facilities permanently, and some 980 temporarily between 1989 and
1991.154 One of the facilities permanently closed was the PEMEX
petroleum plant in Mexico City which had employed 5000 people.155
Furthermore, some 2000 plant owners have signed56pledges to install
pollution-control equipment by certain deadlines.1

Complementing this recent regulatory activity, more money is being contributed to the cleanup effort. The Mexican commitment
alone has dramatically increased. Since 1989, Mexico's federal environmental budget has grown more than eleven times its original size
to a total fund of more than $78 million. 57 This represents an
1800% increase in available funds.158 Additionally, the World Bank

has agreed to release $1.8 billion to the effort, 159 while NAFTA itself will provide up to $10 billion through joint U.S. and Mexico
contributions. 60 The Integrated Border Plan will provide additional
funding for the border cleanup. Under this plan, Mexico has committed over $242 million to revamp the border infrastructure.' 6'
Mexico has also committed $239 million for a wastewater facility to
be built in Tijuana." 2 Thus, with this increased funding, Mexico
should finally be able to update its infrastructure by building new
treatment facilities and disposal systems. Further, with this capital
influx Mexico should also be able to train more inspectors, conduct
more inspections, and generally enforce GLEEEP much more
effectively.
Additionally, with the passage of NAFTA, Mexico has received
greater scrutiny by both the international media and the international investor. In a sense, the eyes of the world are now focused on
154. Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation of NAFTA, available in WESTLAW, 1991 WL 434200 (N.A.F.T.A.), at *2
(May 1, 1991) [hereinafter Response of the Administration].
155. Emilia Askari, Aiming to be Green Mexico's Push to Clean Up Has Seen
Some ProgressBut It's a Costly Endeavor, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 29, 1993, at 5A;
Response of the Administration, supra note 154, at *3.
156. Askari, supra note 155, at 5A.
157. Id. This increase means that Mexico now spends 86 cents per capita on the
environment.
158. Id.
159. Augusta Dwyer, Border Clean-Up Loan Approved, EL FINANCIERO INT'L,
Oct. 4-10, 1993, at 1.
160. Rita Beamish, EPA Devising Border Action Planfor Waste Cleanups, Under
NAFTA the U.S. is Allotting the Environment $230 Million This Year, PHILA. INQUIRER,

Sept. 19, 1993, at A3.

161. Response to the Administration, supra note 154, at *3.
162. Gary Lee, Tijuana River Cleanup on Track, Hill Is Told, WASH. POST, Apr.
14, 1994, at A3.
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Mexico. 6 3 Consequently, a new environmental philosophy is emerging south of the border. This environmental ideology has become so
pervasive that multinational corporations, the traditional foes of the
environment, are getting into the act. For example, SabritasGamesa, a Mexican chip and biscuit producer, has replaced their
Mexico City delivery vans with 455 electric vans in an effort to reduce the city's air pollution.' The manufacturer has plans to expand the fleet's size as well as to implement the vans in other highly
polluted cities such as Monterrey and Guadalajara. Other unique efforts are also being made by some local businessmen in Monterrey
who gather 3000 tons of waste daily for use at their electricity plants
that run on garbage.'6 5
Following in their footsteps is General Motors (GM) who is
spending $8 million of its own money on a waste-water treatment
plant in Matamoros where, presently, all of the city's waste is
dumped into a canal that carries it to the Gulf of Mexico. e66 GM
will also be spending $20 million on waste-water treatment plants for
thirty-one of its maquiladora plants. 67 The Mexican pharmaceutical firm of Benavides has agreed to spend $3 million on a similar
plant at its Monterrey location."6 8
Further signs of a new environmental climate are evidenced by the
official and unofficial ecological education of the Mexican populace.
For example, public interest organizations such as Greenpeace and
the Sierra Club now have numerous counterparts in Mexico. 69 Furthermore, the federal government has initiated several programs in
both public and private schools to teach children the value of recycling.' Perhaps most notable, the University of Baja California
and the Colegio De La Fronteria have established masters programs
in environmental studies.' 71 Thus, one must take note of the tremendous reorientation occurring in Mexico. With the influx of capital,
163. This is evidenced by the tremendous amount of national and international
coverage given to the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio and the rebellion in Chiapas.
In the past, such events often received minimal attention.
164. Chris Williams, Zero Pollution Vans Deliver Munchies, EL FINANCIHRO
INT'L, Dec. 6-12, 1993, at 2.
165. Alva Senzek, There's No Free Lunch, EL FINANCIERO INT'L, Dec. 13-19,
1993, at 5.
166. Lazaroff, supra note 15, at 10.
167. Old et al., supra note 21, at 31.
168. Leon Lazaroff, Nothing But Gray Skies, EL FINANCIERO INT'L, Nov. 8-14,
1993, at 10.
169. Askari, supra note 155. "[M]ore than two hundred environmental groups
have sprung up in Mexico within the last decade. Only a handful existed before." Id.
170. Interview with Elsa Saxod, Executive Director, United States-Mexico Border
Progress Foundation, in San Diego, California (Mar. 19, 1994). These programs typically provide government donations in exchange for cans collected by students for
recycling.
171. Id.
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and a new attitude, Mexico should play a significant role in protecting its own environment independent of NAFTA and the Environmental Side Agreement.
V.

CONCLUSION

The political battle against the North American Free Trade
Agreement, though ultimately lost, raised important questions concerning the ecological impact of so large a trade accord. Critics
claim that NAFTA is an environmental nightmare. NAFTA, it is
said, will exacerbate the environmental crisis created by the maquiladora program, Mexico's latest experience with foreign industry.
Furthermore, NAFTA will dilute strict U.S. health standards in order to fulfill its promise of free trade. Both claims are based on precedent set under different treaties and different times.
NAFTA, however, cannot be analyzed with one eye focused on
past agreements. By concentrating solely on the provisions of
NAFTA and its Environmental Side Agreement, the environmental
criticisms of the agreement seem to lose much of their conviction.
Furthermore, if one is to consider external factors in weighing the
success or failure of NAFTA's environmental sensitivity, the focus
should not be on what happened in Mexico in the past, but rather,
on what is occurring in Mexico today. Clearly, a new environmental
philosophy is emerging south of the border. Though still in its early
stages, this philosophy offers strong evidence that the protection of
the environment will not be left to NAFTA itself. Finally, Mexico
itself seems to be both willing and able to enter the arena. Thus, the
environmental criticism is misplaced. With both an environmentally
sensitive treaty and trading partner, NAFTA may become the first
free trade agreement to achieve economic development in an ecologically responsible manner.
REID A. MIDDLETON
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